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ABSTRACT. Since Ackerman in Corporate social
responsiveness, the modern dilemma (1973), pleaded for the
institutionalisation of corporate social performance (CSP)
in business processes, researchers have focused on the role
of strategy in CSP. This article demonstrates that CSP is
institutionalised within the governance structure. We will
attempt to make this clear by means of a description of the
Dutch system of corporate governance. Under certain
circumstances Dutch companies are already bound to
CSP due to prevailing legislation. A governance per-
spective shows that CSP is institutionalised within a
company’s governance structure. ‘‘Processes of respon-
siveness’’, since long regarded as a starting point of CSP-
analysis, appear to be decision-making processes. Within
these processes the expectations of the stakeholders can be
institutionalised, trust can be built and interests can be
incorporated. This makes CSP context-dependent.
However, it is possible to analyse companies by com-
paring the companies’ individual governance structures.
The article concludes that CSP-analysis can fruitfully
extend into analysing in the role of the stakeholders in the
influence-pathways that are incorporated within the
governance structure.
KEY WORDS: corporate governance, corporate social
performance, stakeholder influence
Introduction
There is a growing interest in the relationship
between corporate governance and the social
performance of a company. Literature focuses
specifically on the composition of the board (Coffey
and Wang, 1998; Luoma and Goodstein, 1999),
emphasises the practical implications of certain
theoretical assumptions (Leader, 1999) or studies the
institutional embeddedness of companies (Heath and
Norman, 2004). This study analyses the influence of
pathways that stakeholders and companies use to
balance specific interests and thereby shape the social
performance of a company. It demonstrates the
influence-pathways that can be – and sometimes
have been – constructed by a company and stake-
holders to institutionalise certain social responsibili-
ties. These insights are produced in a description of
the institutionalisation of corporate social perfor-
mance (CSP) in the Dutch system.
In the literature, CSP is defined as ‘‘a business
configuration of principles of social responsibility,
processes of social responsiveness, and policies, pro-
grammes, and observable outcomes as they relate to
the firm’s societal relationships’’ (Wood, 1991, p. 693).
A researcher or manager who theoretically or
practically wishes to implement CSP, therefore, faces
challenges if attempting to create effective links be-
tween these concepts. In corporate processes, the
principles of the company, stakeholders and the
corporate policies meet. Ethical values are shaped
within the interaction with stakeholders and trans-
formed to policies, where the outcomes of certain
policies influence ethical values and stakeholder
expectations again. This article proposes that in such
a conceptual model the governance structure will
play a major role.
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Readers of Ackerman’s article How companies
respond to social demands (1973) will recognise the
theoretical building blocks which by now have
become standard elements in the theoretical discus-
sions on CSP, but which also have become widely
accepted in business administration. Ackerman
(1973) asserts that a company’s CSP is not limited to
good intentions of the management. CSP must be
institutionalised within the business processes and
anchored within society.
In a later publication, Bauer and Ackerman (1976)
enunciates that ‘‘responsiveness’’,1 or, a company’s
willingness to accommodate social developments,
would be an appropriate start of analysis. The social
responsibility of a company is constituted in the
interaction between the company and the stake-
holders. From this observation Bauer and Ackerman
(1976) conclude that one should not so much refer
to corporate social responsibility – the social responsi-
bility of a company – as to corporate social responsive-
ness, or, the willingness to bear the responsibility for
certain prevailing expectations in society.
The notion introduced by Bauer and Ackerman
(1976) did not meet with widespread acceptance. Yet,
a ‘‘company’s responsiveness to social developments’’
has been regarded as the starting point of CSP-analysis
since (e.g. Carrol, 1979; Margolis and Walsh, 2003;
Wartick and Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991).
Wartick and Cochran (1985) elaborate upon the
notion’s process-related character. According to
them, a company’s responsiveness to its environment
is not a static aspect. Instead, the argue, CSP relates
to a continuous interaction between stakeholders –
interested parties on whom a company’s future
existence is (co-)dependent – and the company itself.
It relates to ‘‘processes of responsiveness’’ in which
the company has an own identity. Yet, it cannot
determine what is important without the stakeholder
inputs.
The process approach of Wartick and Cochran
(1985) is detailed by Wood (1991). Not only is the
interaction between a company and its environment
important. While an interaction between norms and
values of a company, as is formulated in the princi-
ples of corporate social responsibility, and the policy
resulting from these norms and values, is also sig-
nificant. Wartick and Cochran (1985) still hold to a
responsibility with a standardised formulation that is
the same for all companies. Wood (1991) asserts that
corporate social responsibility is established by means
of interaction. At a certain moment, a company will
define what it sees as its own responsibility. At times
it might be formulated explicitly. Yet, quite often it
consists of the patterns of expectation which stake-
holders have towards one another and towards the
company. These expectations, which may be traced
back to norms and values, develop within the
‘‘processes of responsiveness’’, eventually leading to
social policies, social programmes and social impacts
(Swanson, 1995, 1999).
Berman and Rowley (2000), having completed a
literature review, regretfully observe that CSP-
analysis has not advanced much beyond a clarifica-
tion of the concept. Some research was been done,
but had been hampered by the researcher’s objective
in wanting to prove that CSP was an important
development. Therefore, together with other
researchers, Berman and Rowley (2000) plea for
more descriptive and inductive research (see also
Griffin, 2000; Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Further
development of the theory has to stay as close to
business practice as possible. With this objective, we
follow the pragmatist’s approach, advocated by
Margolis and Walsh (2003, p. 283). In pleading for a
reorienting perspective on the theory of the firm,
descriptive research strategies are necessary again,
because 30 years of CSP-research has not managed
to overcome critical flaws.
By building on CSP theory, the article demon-
strates that the governance structure of a company
can play an important role in the interaction be-
tween a company and stakeholders, the ‘‘processes of
responsiveness’’. Since Ackerman (1973) researchers’
attention has been mainly focused on company
strategy (Wood, 1991). Below, it is argued that the
stakeholders may structurally exercise control over a
company by their position towards the company’s
management as it is defined in the governance
structure. In this paper we attempt to mirror business
practice as accurately as possible by describing the
role of the institutional environment in which
companies’ operation. Analysis of the governance
structure makes it possible for the researcher, con-
sultant and manager to understand the processes that
embody CSP, so that the concept can successfully be
made operational. This furthermore develops in-
sights on how stakeholders can be represented in the
networks in which a company operates (Leader,
178 Frank J. de Graaf and Cor A. J. Herkstro¨ter
1999) and also how stakeholder-learning-dialogues
are shaped in existing governance systems.
By making this statement, the paper focuses
strongly on the position of the employees in Dutch
corporations and by the formal regulation that give
them a position in the governance structure. How-
ever, if – besides shareholders – one group of
stakeholders can have a formal position, others could
acquire a comparable position. For example, within
cooperatives stakeholders unite to fulfil a specific
economic need. Clients, for example within coop-
erative banks, or suppliers, often in the agricultural
sector, thereby have a critical role in the governance
structure also.
CSP and corporate governance
Analysis of corporate governance yields important
insights to researchers and managers involved in
CSP. The general assumption is that the interaction
between the stakeholders and a corporation forms
the starting point for CSP-analysis (Bauer and
Ackerman, 1976; Berman and Rowley, 2000;
Swanson, 1995, 1999). In order to implement CSP a
company has to have a good insight in its environ-
ment. In order to reach this insight, Wood (1991)
defines three policy instruments: stakeholder man-
agement, issue management and environment anal-
ysis. She uses these tools to create a functional
description of the ‘‘processes of responsiveness’’.
Management mainly determines the responsiveness
of a company to social developments.
Corporate governance literature reveals yet an-
other perspective aside from these three policy
instruments. Luoma and Goodstein (1999, p. 554)
argue that, if we assume that company’s attention to
the social interests of stakeholders is regarded as
important and legitimate, it may also be assumed that
this is institutionalised in social structures, especially in
corporate governance. For researchers of CSP it is
important to analyse the relationship between the
position of stakeholders within the company man-
agement and the processes and performance of a
company (p. 561). Slowly, empirical research, which
studies this relationship, is published. However, the
results are not (Coffey and Wang, 1998; Hillman
et al., 2001) unambiguous. Some further theoretical
development on this matter seems to be of great value.
By means of their position in the governance
structure, stakeholders structurally influence com-
pany policy. The governance structure is the sum
total of all formal procedures and processes in which
decisions are made (Nooteboom, 1999; Williamson,
2000). Responsibilities are institutionalised in the
corporate governance structure. If, for example, a
company has to submit decisions to a works council
then this may influence the decisions. This concept
will be elaborated below.
The governance structure is the result of the
company’s characteristics, its identity and of the
demands imposed on the company by the stake-
holders and by the law and regulations as imposed by
the authorities. The governance system may be
defined as the legal framework within which the
relationship between stakeholders and a company
may be constituted2 (Weimer and Pape, 1999;
Whitley, 1999). This legal framework, largely
determines which structural influence stakeholders
do exercise on company policy within the gover-
nance system. The governance system, itself how-
ever, is also determined by the influence stakeholder
groups have (had) on society.
The opinions on governance systems differ per
theory and per national context. Authors such as
Freeman and Reed (1993), Kochan and Rubinstein
(2000) and Davis et al. (1997) argue for a steward-
ship or stakeholder model for corporate governance.
In this theoretical conception it is stated that the
company must not only be accountable to the
shareholders as is the rule in the Anglo-Saxon
nations. A company is a type of stakeholders’ asso-
ciation.
The stakeholder perspective of a company sup-
plements the agency theory, which is so prevalent in
business economics and management science. The
agency conception is based on the conflict of
interests between the shareholder (principal) and the
manager (agent). Critics of the agency theory pro-
pose that too much emphasis is placed on the
conflict of interest between rationally operating ac-
tors, which is between the managers and the owners
of a company, the shareholders.
Insights concerning the role of a company’s
governance structure may contribute to research and
policy making in the field of CSP. The interaction
between a company and its stakeholders is largely
institutionalised in the governance structure.
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Therefore, the company structure must fulfil a role
within academic CSP-analysis and in the policy
making of governments and companies. The shape
of this structure in a certain national context mainly
determines how and when stakeholders influence a
company’s policy. With the choice of this perspec-
tive, we make a fundamental choice regarding the
form of CSP-analysis. It is not an additional policy
area for companies. The corporate social responsi-
bility is being institutionalised within the corporate
governance structure. Researchers are mainly inter-
ested in the question how companies accommodate
developments going beyond the imposed limited
economic, legal and technical demands.
CSP and the national governance system
As some of the authors with this view, Kochan and
Rubinstein (2000) refer to the governance system as
it exists in continental Europe and Japan in their plea
for the stakeholder perspective of a company. These
systems are network-oriented (Moerland, 1995;
Nooteboom, 1999; Weimer and Pape, 1999). The
collaboration amongst the various stakeholders is
essential. According to researchers such as Freeman
and Reed (1993), it is the lack of collaboration in the
governance systems in Anglo-Saxon nations which
lead to the search for alternatives. The American and
Anglo-Saxon system may be categorised as market-
oriented with its emphasis on the financial market
and, primarily, on the shareholder seeking a return
on his investment (see Table I). In a company, the
expectations of the stakeholders are largely institu-
tionalised within the governance structure.
In the governance structures in the United States
and even more in the United Kingdom, expectations
of the financial markets (market-oriented) are more
prominent. Much attention is given to the share-
holders’ position, both regarding their involvement as
well as regarding the supply of information. The wider
social interest must mainly be protected by (govern-
mental) regulations. In this constellation, company
and stakeholders enter into short-term relationships
that are broken as soon as one of either party is given a
more interesting offer. Due to the stakeholders’ focus
on their own interest, the governance system in the
United States is based on laws and regulations more
than it is in Europe (Nooteboom, 1999). Suitable
recent illustrations of this phenomenon are the
TABLE I
The characteristics of governance systems
Governance system Market-based Network-based
General characteristics Market orientation Internal orientation
Short-term relations Long-term relations
Competition Cooperation
Governance structure Capitalist form, focus on the
financial markets, the shareholders
Collective form, focus on a group of stakeholders
Forms of corporate control Exit-based, when
dissatisfied, stakeholders leave
Voice-based, when dissatisfied, stakeholders
complain in the network
Governance mechanism Contract Trust
Governance evaluation Third parties Networks
Theory Agency theory Stewardship theory/normative
stakeholder theory
Research orientation Agency problems between the
management and shareholders
Balancing stakeholder interests
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reactions to the financial scandals in business. The
Dutch corporate governance code imposes general
demands on companies. Companies may even ignore
certain measures if they motivate their approach with
the proper reasons. In the United States the response
was to create more detailed legislation. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was adopted for example.
The Anglo-Saxon practice, therefore, differs quite
substantially from the Dutch governance system.
Within the Dutch, network-oriented system, the
supervisory board controls the executive board.
The preservation of the company’s continuity is an
important element in this respect. In view of this
broader responsibility the supervisory directors have
a task, which exceeds the individual interests of a
single group of stakeholders. The works council and
the shareholders meeting may only nominate the
members of the supervisory board. This Dutch
variant was chosen so that no single stakeholder
eventually might exercise decisive influence in
the company. Collaboration for a long-term and the
continuity of the company are at the core of the
Dutch network-oriented system.
We can mark the starting point of our analysis
with the conclusion that national governance sys-
tems could largely determine company policy. It is
important to look at how a company has responded
to a structural, social development and what the role
of the corporate structure was in this respect. This
may be different for each national context. Even
differences within the governance structure per
individual company are important in the design of
social corporate governance.
Two forms of influence
Now that we have been able to determine that the
governance structure plays an important role within
the interaction between a company and stakeholders
in the national context, it is important to examine
the way in which a company and stakeholders
mutually influence one another. Even the influ-
encing processes may differ per governance system.
There are two forms of influencing by stake-
holders (Frooman, 1999; Gargiulo, 1993). First,
stakeholders may directly influence a company,
for example, by entering into negotiations on pol-
icy issues. Second, stakeholders possess indirect
influence-pathways. It is a case of indirect influence
when stakeholders attempt to convince a third party
to represent their interest. In certain cases, this third
party may exercise more influence in the company
than the individual stakeholder.
Direct and indirect influence-pathways are also
evident within governance systems. Primarily,
stakeholders may directly influence a company be-
cause they possess a (formal) voice in company
policy. In network-oriented systems of corporate
governance, as they exist in Europe and Japan, the
emphasis has always been on this kind of influence
(see Table I). Most Dutch companies have adopted
the objective to consider the interests of clients,
shareholders and employees in their policy. All of
the concerned parties are also co-responsible to
safeguard the social interest in the company. Meta-
phorically speaking, employees, shareholders and
clients attend the board meeting.
A second form of influence consists of indirect
influence-pathways. With the help of third parties,
such as supervisory bodies and the government,
stakeholders may influence decisions. Regulations
serve, for instance, to protect the stakeholders’
interests. The government and supervisory bodies
are responsible for the quality of these regulations
and they check whether the regulations are ob-
served. When there is a threat of opposing interests
between a stakeholder and a company parties will
examine their options by looking at their legal po-
sition. If a court case might improve their position
they may decide to initiate it.
Even non-governmental organisations such as
environmental groups often make use of such indi-
rect mechanisms. Via the media or via the court they
attempt to obtain attention for a certain matter in
order to persuade a company to change.
In market-oriented systems of corporate gover-
nance – e.g. in the United States3 – the emphasis is
on this form of influence. The government is pri-
marily focused on protecting a properly functioning
market. The government limits its role in the
structuring of the negotiations between company
and stakeholders to guaranteeing the shareholders’
influence. The administration of justice is important
in handling the conflicts of interests between stake-
holders and companies.
In Anglo-Saxon systems as well as in European
systems both forms of influence play a role. It is
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especially the emphasis on influence-pathways that
makes the systems different. This emphasis is partly
determined by culture. A Dutch stakeholder may,
perhaps go to court over a certain matter. Yet, pri-
marily, he will attempt to solve a conflict of interest by
negotiations. Dutch law obligates him to do so. Cul-
tural characteristics such as the emphasis on negotia-
tions and the seeking for a common basis for
agreement have been institutionalised in the prevailing
regulations. A description of Dutch law concerning
corporate governance may shed light on this.
A closer look at the Dutch governance
system
The implications of a governance perspective of CSP
are discussed in this paragraph. We do this by
describing the development within the Dutch cor-
porate governance system. We describe how social
interests and the stakeholders’ interests are institu-
tionalised. It will become evident that the demands
on and the expectations of corporate governance are
primarily determined by the institutional context.
The reciprocal influence between company and
stakeholders is shaped in mostly subtle governance
mechanisms. Within Dutch company law the de-
mands imposed on corporate governance are laid
down in the Structure Act that was passed in 1971.
In the light of the current discussion on corporate
governance in The Netherlands, in which the po-
sition of the shareholders is given much attention, it
is striking that the principle of the Structure Act was
to find a solution for employee participation in The
Netherlands. In the works council, the employees
were given a voice in company management. The
establishment of the works council was also regu-
lated by the Works Councils Act adopted by the
Dutch parliament in 1971.
The Structure Act was the result of a broad social
discussion in The Netherlands. In the 60s the so-
called Verdam Committee had indicated three rea-
sons why the existing legislation had to be amended:
1. It appeared that in practice, the role and the
interests of the capital supplier were not exclu-
sively the leading factor in corporate policy.
2. The companies’ striving for profit for the
benefit of the shareholders was an insufficient
justification to withhold influence from the
other stakeholders.
3. There was a nationwide social discussion
about the role of the ‘‘factor labour’’ (the
employees), which demanded a response
from the legislature. In this discussion pri-
marily the pleas for employees’ self-gover-
nance received much support, although there
was also some harsh opposition from
employer-related groups.
The Structure Act (see Figure 1) has been referred to
as the ‘‘miracle of The Hague’’. Labour and capital
were reconciled with one another in a time in which
they had opposing positions in the public debate and
in which companies were regarded with suspicion.
For a long time no agreement seemed possible in the
social debate. Companies strongly resisted the far-
reaching influence of the employees as advocated by
politicians and trade unions.
In the act the (suggested) contrary interests of
labour and capital were bridged by giving the
supervisory board4 a key role to play. They became
responsible for the adoption of the annual accounts,
the supervision of the general strategy and for the
appointment of the members of the executive board
and of the supervisory board. This latter ingredient
meant that the composition of the board of super-
visory directors was the result of co-option. The
current members determined who was newly
appointed in the board. Shareholders and employees
were only granted options to recommend new







Business unit Business unit Business unit 
Figure 1. The governance structure according to the
Dutch Structure Act of 1971.
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proposed candidate. Again, a power balance was
developed carefully, between various stakeholder
interests. Interests in developing subtle influence-
pathways. Stakeholders have influence on the
supervisory board, and it is difficult for the board to
overrule them, but when stakeholders put too much
pressure on the board to advocate their interests, the
board has its own legal obligations to stand for the
companies’ interests.
With the Structure Act the works councils were
given a special place in company law. The fact that
they could nominate supervisory directors was sup-
plemented by clauses in the Works Councils Act.
Due to this act, the works council received three
other rights (1) the right of information, (2) the right
of advice and (3) some decisions depend on its
approval. The last-mentioned right relates to deci-
sions regarding reorganisations, investments and
changes affecting the legal status of all employees.
After 1971 the works council’s position was rein-
forced. The law was amended a number of times and
the role of works councils became a topic of case law.
One of the last modifications of the law was the
supplement of Article 28 of the Works Councils Act
in 1998 (see Appendix 1). This states that the works
council may give advice on social subjects and on the
company’s sustainability policies. Due to this
amendment, social policy and social sustainability
became a company objective. The works council
had to supervise the safeguarding of these principles.
Thus, (again) its broad social responsibility was
reinforced. No longer did the works council only
safeguard limited employees’ interests.
This right of advice is important, which demon-
strates how subtle the role of stakeholders in influ-
encing the pathways can be. The management may
not treat an advice of the works council as a mere
formality. Company managers have to ask for advice
at such a term that it is possible for the works council
to exercise its influence on the decision. If the works
council is able to prove that the company manage-
ment did not listen to it before the decision was
made then the works council may take the matter to
court. The judge may, as long as the procedure is
pending, fully or partially revoke the decision and
cancel any consequences. If the management rejects
an advice then the company management has to
make clear that the advice was seriously considered
and give a proper motivation for its rejection.
It may be concluded that the Dutch system
of corporate governance wants to guarantee a proper
interaction between the company and the
stakeholders. Moreover, legislation decrees that a
company represents a broader social interest and not
merely an economic interest. The environmental
and social issues are mentioned explicitly in this re-
spect. Aside from the supervisory board the works
council has a task in the execution of the broader
social responsibility.
Against this backdrop, it is understandable that
in 1999 the Social Economic Council (SER) – an
advisory body of the Dutch government, with
representatives for employees, employers and
independent members – created an advisory report
that no additional legislation concerning the field
of CSP is needed in The Netherlands for the time
being. For this had already been incorporated in
the law. In its report De winst van waarden5 the
SER uses a definition of socially responsible
business6, which is in the line of the legal obli-
gations of a company. CSP is regarded as both the
interaction between stakeholders as well as the
broad social responsibility of a company (SER,
2000, p. 13). With its report the SER once again
confirmed the stakeholders’ shared responsibility
for the company’s continuity.
CSP and stakeholders’ influence
Anchoring of CSP
The development in Dutch company law reveals
how a company’s social role has been anchored and
what the role of the stakeholders is. Dutch legislature
has defined this influence in several ways:
– Some stakeholders exercise influence on com-
pany policy. This defines the interactive char-
acter of CSP.
– Stakeholders have a joint responsibility to mon-
itor the consequences of company policy for
the environment and the social conditions of
the concerned parties.
The stakeholders’ role can be based on the Struc-
ture Act and the Works Councils Act and it is in
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agreement with the CSP definition. Interaction
with stakeholders and a broad social responsibility
are the key elements of CSP (see definition on page
2). The responsibility is defined and the interaction
between stakeholders and a company is structured.
In the meantime, legislature has also taken an
interest in what companies ‘‘do’’, e.g. in the
reporting of performances. A further analysis of the
way in which the Dutch legislature directed both
the social responsibility as well as the influence
processes of stakeholders makes clear why it is so
important that these have been formulated in a
general sense.
Stakeholders’ influence in Dutch corporations
A main principle of the Dutch legislation is that the
legislature does not want to, and cannot, impose all
social demands on a company. Especially in the
Dutch governance system, which is network-
oriented, restraint is an important principle. Social
responsibility cannot only be defined in rules. This
means that a company and its stakeholders recognise
a broader responsibility than their own, limited self-
interest. This responsibility is institutionalised in
opportunities for participation. Opportunities for
discussion and participation – often also imposed by
legislation – supplement the demands that are
imposed on company policy.
The broad responsibility is expressed in an often
quite subtle interaction between various influence-
pathways (see Table II). These are partly a product
of legislation yet often also based on agreements
between stakeholders and a company. It relates to
direct influence-pathways in which discussion and
dialogue are important. These instruments are more
flexible and interactive than regulations (Grandori,
1997; Nooteboom, 1999). The stakeholders and
company are expected to work on a stable
TABLE II
Examples of direct and indirect influence-pathways
Direct influence-pathways Indirect influence-pathways





Meetings with stock exchange authorities Regulation of the stock exchange
Meeting with works councils Regulation (Works Councils Act, Structure Act), internal regulation,
statutory arrangements and other
Report of the Works
Council in the annual report
Meetings with labour unions Agreements on working conditions, other agreements, labour laws
Performance interview Employment contract
(Negotiations on) nomination
and appointment of supervisory directors
Profile of the external directors, screening by supervisory authorities
Committees of the supervisory board Corporate governance policy, regulations by governments, reports
presenting the advice of committees regarding corporate governance
Consulting supervisory authorities Regulations and supervision
Client association Influence-pathways can be institutionalised in the articles of association
of the companyCustomer association
Board of a cooperative Articles of association of cooperatives, legislation
regarding cooperatives
Negotiations with (major) clients
and other meetings with clients (panels)
Contracts and other agreements
Negotiations with governments Regulations and other agreements
Negotiations with and in branch associations Covenants and other agreements
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relationship based on mutual trust. Only then both
parties can be useful one to another.
Stakeholders and a company may together decide
whether they want to anchor this responsibility even
legally, for example in the articles of association –
please refer to examples of this in Appendix 2.
Articles of association are usually put in such a way
that they offer maximum managerial freedom. Yet,
theoretically, it is possible that stakeholders modify
these statutory objectives or that they challenge a
company if, in their opinion, the principles
embodied in the articles of association are insuffi-
ciently reflected in company policy. This may occur
in the meeting of shareholders. Yet, even employees,
government and supervisory bodies may exercise
influence. It is an example of direct influence when
stakeholders are able to amend the articles of asso-
ciation. It is an example of indirect influence when
stakeholders take an issue to court if there is a dis-
crepancy between the principles laid down in the
articles of association and the actual policies.
Defining responsibilities in influence-pathways
A description of the Dutch governance system shows
that a company’s social responsibility may be defined
in two ways.
First, the stakeholders may claim their position in
the legal structure if they think that one of their
interests is threatened. In order to increase the power
of their protest they can take their case to court.
Both shareholders as well as employees are entitled
to do this. In such a situation it is a matter of indirect
influence. A third party, able to exercise more power
in a domain, is committed to protect the stake-
holders’ interests. The advantages of indirect influ-
ence-pathways are, amongst other things, that they
offer a greater amount of legal certainty and that the
rights and duties can be clearly formulated. The
disadvantage is that regulations may be inflexible and
the concerned parties may have the tendency to seek
for loopholes (Grandori, 1997; Nooteboom, 1999).
Second, stakeholders may exercise influence by
making use of direct influence-pathways. Bodies
such as the shareholders meeting (of limited liability
companies), the members meeting (of cooperatives)
and the works council are such mechanisms. Direct
influence-pathways seem to be more flexible than
indirect mechanisms determined by regulations.
Another advantage is that arrangements can be made
to which every stakeholder agrees. The disadvantage
is a more restricted legal certainty. Works councils
have often remedied this by making extensive
agreements and covenants with the company’s
executive board.
Attention for the first form of stakeholder influ-
ence sheds a new light on CSP policies. As stated
before, it is essential in this respect that companies
have to be responsible for more than the mere
adherence to the regulations. This can be achieved
by looking at the opportunities for involvement. In
this context more normative and cognitive processes
play a role in which norms and values are embodied
before they are directly transformed into regulations.
Dynamics in stakeholder influence
A governance perspective of CSP also teaches us
about the structure of stakeholder influence. The
position of employees has been further expanded
after the launch of the Works Councils Act.
Employees had been given a formal position by the
Works Council Act. It offered the opportunity to
further develop rights, also in view of the develop-
ment of case law regarding the status of the works
council within a company.
Based on the theoretical perspective above, the
question is whether the recourse to legal action in the
relationship between the works council and company
management has not been gained at the expense of
either party’s opportunities of implementing a
broader social responsibility. The works council has
various direct influence-pathways available for its
operation. Proper consultation and open dialogue are
quite important in this respect. The recourse to legal
action may obstruct this open consultation process
since the related parties are continuously checking
the legal validity of statements.
During the past 15 years, the one-sided attention
for the employee’s status in legislation has evoked a
counter movement in the Netherlands. Many
shareholders are of the opinion that their influence
on company policy is too small. In all possible ways,
shareholders attempt to influence companies,
supervisory bodies and the government to create
more space for them. In such instances shareholder
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representing groups continuously seek media
exposure and take legal action. These indirect
influence-pathways are utilised since the direct
influence-pathways have proven ineffective accord-
ing to the concerned parties. The shareholders
meeting, an example of a mechanism in which direct
influence is feasible, offers the shareholders insuffi-
cient means to cause the company management to
change its course. Social pressure – in a small
country as the Netherlands often peer-group control
(Moerland, 1995; Nooteboom, 1999) – will proba-
bly lead to the fact that shareholders obtain a better
grip on corporate governance.
Concluding remarks
The interaction between a company and its envi-
ronment is often seen as the starting point for CSP-
related analysis. The interaction between parties can
be studied by means of an analysis of the influence-
pathways as defined within the governance struc-
ture. By hooking stakeholders on to the governance
structure of the company, the social values that these
stakeholders represent, are hence taken into account.
Values, norms and expectations are evident in the
structure of influence processes. It is useful to look at
such processes when assessing the social performance
of an individual company. These processes define
the recognised responsibility and position of the
company and its stakeholders.
Empirical research in CSP has focused on the
determination of indicators by means of which the
outcome of company policy can be assessed.
Margolis and Walsh (2003) show that it has led to
many conflicting studies without an attendant
development in CSP theory. A governance per-
spective offers the opportunity to not only study
policy content but processes in which CSP is shaped
also. This makes it possible to study the institu-
tionalisation of CSP, a long-standing research
objective (Ackerman, 1973; Berman and Rowley,
2000; Margolis and Walsh, 2003). CSP is institu-
tionalised by ‘‘organising’’ whose interest is taken into
account within decision-making processes. This is done by
structuring direct and indirect influence-pathways.
This increasingly gives empirical evidence for
how stakeholder-learning-dialogues are developed
within a governance system (Daboub and Calton,
2002) and how trust can be build in organisational
governance (Caldwell and Karri, 2005). The Dutch
case supplies proof of Caldwell and Karri’s (2005)
plea for building trust in economic systems by
developing a stewardship model of the firm.
Adopting a governance perspective on CSP,
enables deeper insight into the role of the basic
assumptions or principles of a company. Some view a
company’s code of conduct as reflecting the princi-
ples of CSP (Swanson, 1995, 1999; Wood, 1991). A
governance perspective reveals that the basic princi-
ples in which social responsibility is defined are an-
chored in a host of other procedures and processes,
which are mainly to be found in the governance
structure. This structure also relates the company to
the governance system; the second area in which
corporate social responsibility is institutionalised.
To illustrate, responsibilities as defined in the
articles of association, provide a good starting point
for analysis. Even the opportunities for participation
of stakeholders are important in the formation of the
basic principles for company policy and are institu-
tionalised in company policy via direct and indirect
influence-pathways. The role of formal instruments
such as articles of association and participation
deserve more attention in CSP-analysis.
Such subsequent analysis may also be relevant to
the daily practice in companies. Currently, compa-
nies are facing questions of how they may make
certain that employees act in an ethically responsible
way and how they can adjust their actions to the
environment. The problem in this context is that
rules fall short. Employees’ actions cannot be com-
pletely defined in regulations since this would work
at the expense of their individual responsibility
(Bovens, 1998).
Insight in the influence-pathways may lead to a
different manner of handling ethical questions and
social dilemmas, as suggested by various authors
(Caldwell and Karri, 2005; Daboub and Calton,
2002; Leader, 1999; Zadek, 1998). Instead of regu-
lations for actions, it turns out that the dialogue with
stakeholders may take shape in the governance
structure. Upon mutual consultation, a basis may be
found for trust, which makes a solution possible that
is acceptable to the company and the interested
parties. It does not only define how a company must
behave itself, it also defines when a company must
involve the stakeholders in company policy. It is not
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so much the rules for action, but the rules for
stakeholder interaction that institutionalise ethical
behaviour.
The network system of corporate governance as
operating in the Netherlands, amongst other nations,
shows examples of these forms of stakeholder dia-
logue. In Dutch business, the shareholders, clients
and employees exercise their influence in various
ways, within the governance system and the gover-
nance structure. This can result in dialogues that are
based on these positions. They even go further.
Covenants, for example, are made between the
companies and stakeholders (the government) to
jointly develop new policy and change behaviour.
Often, these covenants cannot be enforced legally.
Therefore, mutual monitoring is extra important.
Yet, trust is just as important. The joint responsibility
for policy is accepted and in a dialogue the principles
for the implementation of the policy are determined.
When influence-pathways are taken into account
in CSP-analysis, the problem of stakeholder repre-
sentation in the decision-making processes can be
effectively addressed. In the Netherlands, the works
councils in their current form have existed for over
30 years. A study of their influence on CSP opera-
tion might provide insight in the opportunities and
problems that exist to involve large and extremely
diverse groups in company policy.
Future research on how CSP is institutionalised in
the governance structure should go further than
regulation and the position of employees in a com-
pany. Other, more ‘‘voluntary’’ agreements also
exist within organisations, for example in coopera-
tives where clients or suppliers have a critical role.
Major lessons can be drawn from this for the rela-
tionships with clients, shareholders and interest
groups. Critics state that the current debate on greater
influence for the shareholders has lead to more and
sometimes counterproductive regulation. This may
be counteracted by looking at how direct influence-
pathways – in which trust plays a major role – may be
improved. A stakeholder committee, in which clients,
shareholders as well as employees are represented, can
play a role in this. The committee might make rec-
ommendations for who are important to the company
and how they might be involved in company policy.
Finally, we should mention a number of major
limitations of a governance perspective of CSP. The
perspective as presented in the current paper has a
focus on formal influence-pathways and processes.
Informal processes are not dealt with even though
these might be at least as important. Processes might
be neatly arranged on paper. Yet, in practice, they
might not be effective.
Moreover, this article deals with the importance
of the national context. Yet, more and more com-
panies operate in several countries. Thus, many
Dutch companies have major interests abroad. The
analysis perspective described here takes this only
partly into account.
Notes
1 The word ‘‘responsiveness’’ is derived from ‘‘respon-
sibility’’. ‘‘Responsiveness’’, therefore, means ‘‘to be
willing to be responsible for...’’. Thus, the concept has
strongly normative overtones (Bovens, 1998; Swanson,
1995).
2 This system goes beyond the governmental laws on
corporate governance. It also relates to legislation in the
field of supervision and other regulations protecting the
stakeholders e.g. by legislation which organises consum-
ers’ rights. Another Dutch example is that of the super-
vision of various economic sectors in The Netherlands
as it is organised in commodity boards. These indepen-
dent bodies operate within the legal framework pre-
scribed by the government and are managed by
employers’ and employees’ representatives.
3 Aside from the Federal Government, the States
exercise a primary role in the formation of governance
systems in the United States. Therefore, here we talk
about governance systems. Per State there are differ-
ences in the regulations.
4 Dutch companies’ mainly operate in a two-tier
board system, with an executive board and an indepen-
dent supervisory board.
5 Lit. ‘The return on values’, translator.
6 The SER refers to social business, yet it explains the
concept in the sense that the term CSP may be utilised.
Appendix 1
Article 28 of the Works Councils Act (WOR) since
1998
1. The works council promotes, as much as
within its powers, the observance of all regu-
lations that apply to the company in the field
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of the employment conditions, as well as the
regulations in the field of the employment
conditions and times for work and rest of the
personnel employed within the company.
2. The works council, moreover, promotes
according to its powers the work progress
meetings, as well as the transfer of authority
within the company, so that the persons em-
ployed within the company may be involved
as much as possible in the regulation of the
employment in the section of the company
in which they are employed.
3. The works council in general guards against
discrimination within the company and par-
ticularly promotes the equal treatment of
men and women as well as the hiring of the
handicapped and minorities in the company.
4. The works council promotes, according to
its powers, the company’s care of the envi-
ronment, including which the creation or
modification of facilities, be they policy-
related, organisational and administrative, in
relation to the environment.
Appendix 2: The broad social objective
of companies is defined in the articles
of association of e.g. Dutch financial
institutions
Dutch companies have defined their social respon-
sibility in the articles of association. They all did this
in various ways reflecting the organisation’s specific
character.
The ING Group, the largest financial service
organisation of The Netherlands with a balance
sheet value of approx. 830 billion Euros has laid
down its objective in the Foundation for ING
Continuity. This foundation issues depositary re-
ceipts of shares. When the continuity of the com-
pany is endangered, for instance in case of a hostile
takeover, she can issue additional shares to protect
the company. This broad social objective, legally
necessary in the Netherlands to establish anti-take-
over measures, is also found in article 3, section A:
The promotion of the interests of the holders of
(depositary receipts of) shares (....) of the ING Group
N.V. (....) also with consideration for the interests of
(I) the company itself (II) the interests of companies
that are operated by the company and the companies
that are affiliated with the company in a group (III) the
interests of all other parties affiliated with the company
in such a way that all of these interests will be weighed
and preserved as well as possible.
ABN AMRO Holding N.V., a bank with a balance
sheet total of over 560 billion Euros, has defined the
broad social objective in the articles of association,
article 2. lid 3:
The promotion of the direct and indirect interests of
all parties that in any way are involved in the company,
as well as of the company’s continuity and the conti-
nuity of the companies affiliated with it.
The company interest may also be emphatically
formulated for a single stakeholder group. The
Rabobank Group (balance sheet total 403 billion
Euros), has a cooperative association. This is
emphatically a member objective. In Article 2, sec-
tion 1 of the articles of association it says:
The objective of Rabobank Nederland is the promo-
tion of the interests of its members.
The social role may also be formulated quite spe-
cifically, as is the case with the Triodos Bank N.V.
This niche player (balance sheet total 800 million
Euros) focuses on and invests in projects character-
ised by a social or an environmental objective.
Article 2, section 2 of the articles of association
states:
With the operation of the bank, the company strives to
make a contribution to social innovation on the basis
that any human being should be able to develop in
freedom whilst having equal rights and being respon-
sible for the consequences of his or her economic
actions for his fellow human being and the earth, all in
the widest sense of the word.
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